The WIKILEAKS Public Library of US Diplomacy (PlusD) holds the world's largest searchable collection of United States confidential, or formerly confidential, diplomatic communications. As of April 8, 2013 it holds 2 million records comprising approximately 1 billion words. The collection covers US involvements in, and diplomatic or intelligence reporting on, every country on earth. It is the single most significant body of geopolitical material ever published. The PlusD collection, built and curated by WikiLeaks, is updated from a variety of sources, including leaks, documents released under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and documents released by the US State Department systematic declassification review.
A February, 2010 cable coming from the US embassy in Moscow, reveals that the US was seeking to involve Russia in the efforts to manage the chaos in Afghanistan.
A particular phrase in the summary reveals that the Americans had already tried to achieve economic and even military(!) Russian involvement in Afghanistan: "Efforts to have Russia contribute substantial economic and military assistance have stalled."
Another part reveals that the Russians were quite cautious about the prospect of a Russian involvement as they knew that the Americans have failed to achieve stability in the country: "Although the GOR shares our perception of the dangers posed by an unstable Afghanistan, many senior officials are skeptical about the prospects for American success and believe the GOR should avoid associating too closely with our efforts."
Furthermore, it seems that there were some thoughts around the prospect of a closer approach between Russia and the government in Kabul. An indication that the US imperialists were even thinking to escape from the Afghanistan mess by dragging the Russians into it: "... we should encourage the GIROA [Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan] to approach the GOR directly to double-track assistance requests in order to foster improved Kabul-Moscow communication and to demonstrate to Russia that Kabul values it as a partner."
Key parts [emphasis added]:
Cooperation on Afghanistan remains a top item on the U.S.-Russia agenda. We have achieved success in gaining Russia's public, rhetorical support for our efforts (despite private skepticism) and concrete help on transit issues. Efforts to have Russia contribute substantial economic and military assistance have stalled. Going forward, Embassy Moscow recommends concentrating on three priorities: strategic-level dialogue; counternarcotics cooperation; and transit. Focusing on these three areas will better leverage Russia's concerns about Afghanistan and give us the best chance for successfully achieving our objectives. Russian economic or military assistance may be possible, but we should not have exaggerated expectations.
... Russia's ability and willingness to participate in Afghanistan is limited by three factors. Although the GOR [Government of Russia] shares our perception of the dangers posed by an unstable Afghanistan, many senior officials are skeptical about the prospects for American success and believe the GOR should avoid associating too closely with our efforts. Second, Russia's ambition to transition from an aid-recipient to an aid-donor country remains largely an aspiration. GOR institutions are not yet able to deliver development assistance abroad, let alone in an environment as challenging as Afghanistan. Finally, the memories of the Soviet experience in Afghanistan remain raw, making the GOR (particularly the military and security forces) skittish about anything suggesting a military contribution.
While we should remain open to opportunities for military equipment donations and economic development assistance, we should understand that such aid will be modest -- any value would be largely symbolic with minimal impact on the ground in Afghanistan. In this regard, we should encourage the GIROA [Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan] to approach the GOR directly to double-track assistance requests in order to foster improved Kabul-Moscow communication and to demonstrate to Russia that Kabul values it as a partner.
... roughly 30 percent of Afghanistan's heroin exports go through the "Northern Route", with a total of 75-80 metric tons consumed in Russia itself. GOR officials claim Afghan heroin kills over 30,000 Russians annually and that Afghan exports have increased eight-fold since the fall of the Taliban. For domestic reasons, these statistics provide irresistible temptation for some Russian leaders to assign blame for their domestic drug addiction problem to Afghanistan and -- by extension -- the U.S.
Finally, we should encourage the GOR to increase its support for training Afghan security and counternarcotics forces in Russia and Central Asia.
It
looks like the US imperialist machine was letting moderate voices to
come to surface with alternative suggestions against anti-Russia
hardliners of the neocon school, as things were getting harder and
harder in Afghanistan.
Recall that, nearly four months earlier, a letter from Hillary Clinton's email archive was revealing the views of William Murray, former station chief of CIA in Pakistan and one of the members of a small CIA team that directed the Afghan resistance to the Soviet occupation. Murray was depicting the complete failure of the US strategic goals in Afghanistan.
The whole story confirms that the US imperialists exhibit an extremely aggressive hostility against Russia and China according to the circumstances. When they have to deal with unmanageable dead-ends due to their disastrous policies in certain geopolitical fields, they switch to a more cooperative approach with the Sino-Russian bloc.
Comments
Post a Comment