A roving reporter who covered Italy’s top politicians explains to The Grayzone how his country was reduced to a joint US-Israeli “aircraft carrier,” and raises troubling questions about an Israeli role in the killing of Prime Minister Aldo Moro.
by Kit Klarenberg and Wyatt Reed
Part 6 - Moro rescue committee set up to fail
Throughout Moro’s 55 days in Red Brigades captivity, Italian officials declared that the “state must not bend” to “terrorist demands,” making it clear the Italian government would neither negotiate with the Red Brigades nor release any of its jailed members in return for the PM. The former Italian Prime Minister was subsequently bundled into a car trunk, shot 10 times, and left in the vehicle in central Rome for authorities to find.
Today, many Italians view Rome’s inflexible approach with deep suspicion, given the government’s willingness to negotiate with terrorists both before and after Moro’s murder. Magistrate Mario Sossi, whose kidnap by the Red Brigades purportedly prompted Mossad to approach the group, was released in 1974 after one month in captivity in exchange for some of the radical faction’s imprisoned members.
When the Red Brigades kidnapped Christian Democrat politician Ciro Cirillo in April 1981, Italian authorities bargained directly with his abductors, paying a ransom for his release. That December, when the Red Brigades abducted US General James Dozier, he was “located and freed in a blitz” by a joint US-Italian taskforce.
Today, many Italians view Rome’s inflexible approach with deep suspicion, given the government’s willingness to negotiate with terrorists both before and after Moro’s murder. Magistrate Mario Sossi, whose kidnap by the Red Brigades purportedly prompted Mossad to approach the group, was released in 1974 after one month in captivity in exchange for some of the radical faction’s imprisoned members.
When the Red Brigades kidnapped Christian Democrat politician Ciro Cirillo in April 1981, Italian authorities bargained directly with his abductors, paying a ransom for his release. That December, when the Red Brigades abducted US General James Dozier, he was “located and freed in a blitz” by a joint US-Italian taskforce.
Former Italian general Roberto Jucci contrasted Dozier’s treatment with that of Moro in a 2024 interview. “One of them, they wanted to set free; I have my doubts about the other,” he stated. Jucci was among the few Italians in a position to judge, having been placed in charge of training a special forces squad at a base in Tuscany, which was ostensibly meant to rescue the abducted Prime Minister. Today, he believes “the real goal was to get me out of the way” and ensure Moro was never found. No raids were conducted during his 55 days in captivity.
Jucci told La Repubblica that the formal committee to rescue Moro was “advised by a man sent by the US,” and “composed largely” of representatives of fascist, Gladio-affiliated Masonic lodge P2. These individuals “wanted things to go in a different way from what all honest people were asking for,” and wished for Moro “to be destroyed politically and physically.”
Jucci told La Repubblica that the formal committee to rescue Moro was “advised by a man sent by the US,” and “composed largely” of representatives of fascist, Gladio-affiliated Masonic lodge P2. These individuals “wanted things to go in a different way from what all honest people were asking for,” and wished for Moro “to be destroyed politically and physically.”
Had Moro survived, “Italy’s politics would have developed differently.” Jucci believed the Italian leader could’ve “been freed if all the institutions had worked in this direction.” Declassified British Ministry of Defence files dating to November 1990 show officials in London were well-aware of the role played by P2 in sabotaging official efforts to rescue Moro. The Masonic lodge was described as just one “subversive” force in Rome, employing “terrorism and street violence to provoke a repressive backlash against Italy’s democratic institutions.”
Those documents further noted “circumstantial evidence” indicated “one or more of Moro’s kidnappers was secretly in touch” with Italy’s “security apparatus,” and investigators “deliberately neglected to follow up leads which might have led to the kidnappers and saved Moro’s life.”
Those documents further noted “circumstantial evidence” indicated “one or more of Moro’s kidnappers was secretly in touch” with Italy’s “security apparatus,” and investigators “deliberately neglected to follow up leads which might have led to the kidnappers and saved Moro’s life.”
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