Key
points:
“In
order to understand what has happened it is first necessary to go
back to the way Russian-European relations were developing in the
1990s. Briefly, at that period, the assumption was that Russia would
become the great supplier of energy and raw materials to Europe. This
was the period of Europe's great 'rush for gas' as the Europeans
looked forward to unlimited and unending Russian supplies. It was the
increase in the role of Russian gas in the European energy mix which
made it possible for Europe to run down its coal industry and cut its
carbon emissions and bully and lecture everyone else to do the same.”
“However
the Europeans did not envisage that Russia would just supply them
with energy. Rather they always supposed this energy would be
extracted for them in Russia by Western energy companies. This after
all is the pattern in most of the developing world. The EU calls
this 'energy security' - a euphemism for the extraction of energy in
other countries by its own companies under its own control. It never
happened that way. Though the Russian oil industry was privatised it
mostly remained in Russian hands. After Putin came to power in 2000
the trend towards privatisation in the oil industry was reversed. One
of the major reasons for western anger at the arrest of Khodorkovsky
and the closure of Yukos and the transfer of its assets to the state
oil company Rosneft was precisely because is reversed this trend of
privatisation in the oil industry. In the gas industry the process of
privatisation never really got started. Gas export continued to be
controlled by Gazprom, maintaining its position as a state owned
monopoly gas exporter. Since Putin came to power Gazprom’s position
as a state owned Russian monopoly has been made fully secure.”
“This
combination of resentment and overconfidence is what lies behind the
repeated European attempts to legislate in Europe on energy questions
in a way that is intended to force Russia to 'open up' its the energy
industry there. The first attempt was the so-called Energy Charter,
which Russia signed but ultimately refused to ratify. The latest
attempt is the EU's so-called Third Energy Package. This is presented
as a development of EU anti-competition and anti-monopoly law. In
reality, as everyone knows, it is targeted at Gazprom, which is a
monopoly, though obviously not a European one. This is the background
to the conflict over South Stream. The EU authorities have insisted
that South Stream must comply with the Third Energy Package even
though the Third Energy Package came into existence only after the
outline agreements for South Stream had been already reached.
Compliance with the Third Energy Package would have meant that though
Gazprom supplied the gas it could not own or control the pipeline
through which gas was supplied.”
“What
has just happened is that the Russians have said no. Rather than
proceed with the project by submitting to European demands, which is
what the Europeans expected, the Russians have to everyone’s
astonishment instead pulled out of the whole project. This decision
was completely unexpected. As I write this, the air is of full of
angry complaints from south-eastern Europe that they were not
consulted or informed of this decision in advance. Several
politicians in south-eastern Europe (Bulgaria especially) are
desperately clinging to the idea that the Russian announcement is a
bluff (it isn’t) and that the project can still be saved. Since the
Europeans cling to the belief that the Russians have no alternative
to them as a customer, they were unable to anticipate and cannot now
explain this decision.”
“Gas
from Iran is not available for political reasons. Whilst that might
eventually change, the probability is when it does that the Iranians
(like the Russians) will decide to direct their energy flow
eastwards, towards India and China, rather than to Europe. [...] The
EU's difficulties in finding alternative sources of gas were cruelly
exposed by the debacle of the so-called another Nabucco pipeline
project to bring Europe gas from the Caucasus and Central Asia.
Though talked about for years in the end it never got off the ground
because it never made economic sense.”
“Russia
has sealed a key deal with Iran to swap Iranian oil for Russian
industrial goods. Russia has also agreed to invest heavily in the
Iranian nuclear industry. If and when sanctions on Iran are lifted
the Europeans will find the Russians already there. Russia has just
agreed a massive deal to supply gas to Turkey. Overshadowing these
deals are the two huge deals Russia has made this year to supply gas
to China. [...] The second deal done with China and the deal just
done with Turkey redirect to these two countries gas that had
previously been earmarked for Europe. The gas volumes involved in the
Turkish deal almost exactly match those previously intended for South
Stream. The Turkish deal replaces South Stream. These deals show that
Russia had made a strategic decision this year to redirect its energy
flow away from Europe. Though it will take time for the full effect
to become clear, the consequences of that for Europe are grim. Europe
is looking at a serious energy shortfall, which it will only be able
to make up by buying energy at a much higher price.”
“By
redirecting gas to China, Russia cements economic links with the
country that it now considers its key strategic ally and which has
(or which soon will have) the world’s biggest and fastest growing
economy. By redirecting gas to Turkey, Russia consolidates a
burgeoning relationship with Turkey of which it is now the biggest
trading partner. Turkey is a key potential ally for Russia,
consolidating Russia's position in the Caucasus and the Black Sea.”
“By
redirecting gas away from Europe, Russia by contrast leaves behind a
market for its gas which is economically stagnant and which (as the
events of this year have shown) is irremediably hostile. No one
should be surprised that Russia has given up on a relationship from
which it gets from its erstwhile partner an endless stream of threats
and abuse, combined with moralising lectures, political meddling and
now sanctions. No relationship, business or otherwise, can work that
way and the one between Russia and Europe is no exception.”
“All
the EU countries, even those with historic ties to Russia, have
supported the EU's various sanctions packages against Russia
notwithstanding the doubts they have expressed about the policy. Last
year Greece, another country with strong ties to Russia, pulled out
of a deal to sell its natural gas company to Gazprom because the EU
disapproved of it, even though it was Gazprom that offered the best
price.”
Full
article:
What we see in Ukraine is
probably another failure of various think tanks, mostly from
Washington, which they are funded, of course, by the international
capital. It seems that, apart from the fact that they have
underestimated Putin's abilities, they have also wrongly estimated
that Russia had passed permanently in the neoliberal phase and
would be ready to become an easy victim to promote their plans.
According to these plans, the ultimate goal would be probably to
dissolve the vast Russian territory in future and bring in power
Western-friendly puppet regimes, in order not only to conquer the
valuable resources, but also to impose permanently the neoliberal
doctrine on “unexplored” regions and populations.
|
Read
also:
Comments
Post a Comment