It
is again clear from the current election campaign in France that a
large proportion of the population wants left-wing radical solutions
to exit the crisis. The impressive number of people attending
Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s rallies and joining his movement La France
Insoumise is evidence enough as well as poll survey results on voting
intentions. This is indeed good reason to rejoice. Such upsurge of
support for left-wing radical proposals to turn away from European
treaties is a positive signal. Two other left-wing candidates,
Philippe Poutou and Nathalie Arthaud, also benefit from a large-scale
sympathy. Philippe Poutou’s attack on François Fillon and Marine
Le Pen during the 4 April 2017 television debate also prompted a lot
of interest,
in and outside France.
by
Eric Toussaint , Teresa Rodríguez , Miguel Urbán Crespo , Angela
Klein , Stathis Kouvelakis , Costas Lapavitsas , Zoe Konstantopoulou
, Marina Albiol , Olivier Besancenot , Rommy Arce
Part
2
Considering the experiences of
2015, it is fundamental that those who have no illusions about the
European Union or the eurozone, and are proposing authentic
ecological and socialist perspectives in rupture with the European
Union, as it exists, be reinforced. It is clear that neither the
European Union nor the eurozone can be reformed. It was demonstrated
that it is impossible, on the basis of the legitimacy of universal
suffrage and democratic debate, to persuade the European Commission,
the IMF, the ECB, and the conservative governments in power over most
of Europe to agree to measures that are respectful of the rights of
the Greek people, or of any other population.
The July 5 referendum, which the
European institutions fought tooth and nail by means of blackmail and
coercion (such as forcing the Greek banks to close for five days
preceding the referendum), did not bring them to make any
concessions. On the contrary, totally ignoring all democratic
principles, their demands became considerably more oppressive.
Certainly, there are many measures
that could and should be taken at the European level to stimulate the
economy, reduce social injustice, make the debt sustainable, and
invigorate democracy. In February 2015, Yanis Varoufakis, while
serving as Greek minister of the economy, presented proposals in this
sense, suggesting that Greek debt be exchanged for two new kinds of
bonds — either growth indexed obligations or “perpetual”
obligations — which would never be reimbursed but would be paid
out, interest only, perpetually. These proposals, although moderate
and perfectly achievable, had no chance at all of being accepted by
the European authorities.
This is the case with many
proposals aiming to ease Greece’s and numerous other countries’
debt (joint debt recognition, euro-denominated mutual bonds, etc.).
Technically these proposals are all viable but, in the present
political context and balance of power in the European Union, the
will to put them into practice is lacking. A progressive government
cannot hope to be heard, respected and, even less, assisted by the
European Commission, the ECB, and the European Stability Mechanism.
The ECB can paralyze a eurozone
country’s banking system by cutting off its banks’ access to
liquidities. The ECB’s arbitrary power and the banking union
reinforce the coercive powers the European institutions can use to
counter any experience of progressive policy in Europe.
The treaties have become extremely
restrictive on matters of debt and deficit. The European authorities,
in control of policies, could easily decide to derogate to these
regulations by taking into consideration the state of crisis
(actually they do this for “friendly” governments), but they
clearly had no intention of doing so.
On the contrary, all the
negotiating parties fiercely fought the Greek government even though
it gave proof of great moderation (to say the least). The mainstream
media and numerous European leaders treated Alexis Tsipras and Yanis
Varoufakis as rebels, or even as radical anti-Europeans. Between
January and July 2015, the troika launched a fight against the Greek
government, in order show to the peoples of Europe that there is no
alternative to neoliberal capitalism.
The capitulation of the first
Tsipras government was not enough to satisfy the IMF or the European
leaders. Pressure continued to be laid on the second Tsipras
government to apply ever more neoliberal policies, especially
attacking public property, the welfare and retirement systems, and
assisting big capital through the introduction of further judicial
and legal frameworks favoring privatization and fundamental
structural regression. All these new measures lead to increased
injustice and precariousness.
If the creditors agree to a new
restructuring of the debt, it will be under the condition that the
same kind of policies be continued. In this case, a reduction of the
debt will not at all be a victory or even a consolation. It will be
no more than a measure to ensure continual reimbursements while
seeking to dampen any arising social struggles.
This is the first lesson: unless
they take strong sovereign and unilateral measures of self-defense,
the people and the governments they bring to office to break with
austerity programs cannot put an end to the human rights violations
perpetrated by the creditors and the big corporations.
Some would argue that should a
leftist government come to power in Madrid, it could use the weight
of the Spanish economy (the fourth in the eurozone in terms of GDP)
to negotiate concessions that Tsipras was unable to obtain. But what
would be those concessions? Relaunch production and employment
through heavy public spending and deficits? The ECB and Berlin along
with at least five or six other capitals would oppose such policies!
Taking strong measures against the banks? The ECB, with the support
of the European Commission, would reject such policies.
What is also certain is that if
the radical left entered the government of a country like Cyprus,
Ireland, Portugal, Slovenia, or one of the three Baltic states, they
would not have the weight, facing an unyielding European Commission
or ECB board, to convince these institutions to let them renounce
austerity, stop privatizations, develop public services, and
drastically reduce the debt. These countries will have to resist and
take unilateral measures in the interest of their populations. Could
several progressive governments of eurozone countries form a common
front for renegotiations? It would certainly be very welcome if this
could happen, but the possibility is remote, if only for reasons of
electoral agenda.
Should Jean-Luc Mélenchon win the
upcoming presidential election in France, and his coalition win the
following general election, could a French left-wing government
achieve a reform of the euro? Mélenchon and the staff of his
campaign believe so. It is reasonable to have doubts about this
possibility. Let’s suppose that Mélenchon does win and forms a
government intending to introduce social policies and to reform the
euro. What would be the options?
It is quite likely that a French
government could afford to disobey the current treaties, but it could
not achieve a far-reaching reform of the entire eurozone. To do this
would take simultaneous progressive electoral victories in the major
countries as well as in peripheral countries. That said, it is clear
that a government of a defiant France, and its allies, taking
measures in favor of the French population and the peoples of the
world (for instance, by abolishing Greece’s and developing
countries’ debts towards France) could have a positive effect
throughout Europe.
Having said that, the way out of
the crisis is not of a nationalist nature. As much as in the past it
is necessary to adopt an internationalist strategy and aim for a
European integration that brings together the peoples opposed to the
present form of integration, totally dominated by the interests of
big capital.
The weak links in the
inter-European chain of domination are to be found in the peripheral
countries. If Syriza had adopted a correct strategy in 2015 it could
well have been a turning point. It didn’t happen.
Other weak links where the radical
left may gain power in the not-so-distant future are Portugal and
Spain, and perhaps Cyprus, Ireland, and Slovenia. A progressive move
ahead would depend on the capacity of the radical left to learn the
lessons of 2015 and thus make anticapitalist and democratic proposals
that will trigger popular support. Without doubt, the force of
popular mobilization will be a decisive factor. If the pressure for
real uncompromising change does not invade the streets, the
neighborhoods, and the workplaces, the future will be very dark.
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