The United States is building up its military assets, sparking fears of another regime change attempt against Venezuela—and this one could be far more deadly than the others. Citing an influx of Venezuelan drugs into the U.S., the Trump administration is rapidly building up its military forces, encircling the South American nation, one which has been in Washington’s crosshairs for over a quarter of a century. MintPress News explores Trump’s extraordinary claims and assesses the history of U.S. efforts to overthrow the Venezuelan government.
by Alan Macleod
Part 2 - Claims vs Evidence
The Trump administration’s extraordinary claims about Maduro and Venezuela have convinced few experts. Professor Julia Buxton of Liverpool John Moores University, a specialist in both global drug policy and Venezuelan politics, told MintPress:
The claim that Venezuela is a major drugs producer has been an ongoing theme of the U.S. campaign against Venezuela dating back to the early 2000s. This kind of anti-drug messaging is really common in U.S. foreign policy and strategy for at least 100 years. What we have got here is essentially just recycled Ronald Reagan [talking points] … It is unsubstantiated and absurd, and it is really not backed by any official data.
The data does indeed jar wildly with the administration’s accusations. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime’s World Drug Report 2025 explains that cocaine—the drug most associated with South America—is primarily produced in Colombia, Peru, or Bolivia, and transported via ports in Ecuador to the United States. Venezuela is not mentioned at all in the 98-page document, which catalogs producers, consumers, suppliers, and supply lines of drugs.
The claim that Venezuela is a major drugs producer has been an ongoing theme of the U.S. campaign against Venezuela dating back to the early 2000s. This kind of anti-drug messaging is really common in U.S. foreign policy and strategy for at least 100 years. What we have got here is essentially just recycled Ronald Reagan [talking points] … It is unsubstantiated and absurd, and it is really not backed by any official data.
The data does indeed jar wildly with the administration’s accusations. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime’s World Drug Report 2025 explains that cocaine—the drug most associated with South America—is primarily produced in Colombia, Peru, or Bolivia, and transported via ports in Ecuador to the United States. Venezuela is not mentioned at all in the 98-page document, which catalogs producers, consumers, suppliers, and supply lines of drugs.
The vast majority of lethal drugs produced in South America travel via the Pacific coastline from Ecuador. In terms of supply routes, a small amount of Colombian cocaine is trafficked through the country’s long and porous rainforest border with Venezuela, and then transported via the Caribbean. But this is minuscule in comparison to that transported via Pacific ships, over the land route through Central America and Mexico, or simply flown directly to the U.S. from the cocaine producing states.
The U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency’s own 2025 National Drug Threat Assessment report essentially agrees with the U.N. Indeed, the 90-page document touches on Venezuela in only two paragraphs on a single page—a clear indicator of the threat posed by the Caribbean nation to the U.S.
The section addresses Tren de Aragua’s criminal activities, but does not attempt to link them to the Venezuelan government. In fact, a declassified U.S. National Intelligence Council report from April 2025 concedes that:
The Maduro regime probably does not have a policy of cooperating with TDA and is not directing TDA movement to and operations in the United States. The IC [intelligence community] bases this judgment on Venezuelan law enforcement actions demonstrating the regime treats TDA as a threat.
It goes on to note that Venezuelan intelligence, military, and police services have been “engaged in armed confrontations” with Tren de Aragua, and that it “has not observed the regime directing TDA, including to push migrants to the United States, which probably would require extensive [REDACTED] coordination.” “FBI analysts agree with the above assessment,” the document concludes.
The U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency’s own 2025 National Drug Threat Assessment report essentially agrees with the U.N. Indeed, the 90-page document touches on Venezuela in only two paragraphs on a single page—a clear indicator of the threat posed by the Caribbean nation to the U.S.
The section addresses Tren de Aragua’s criminal activities, but does not attempt to link them to the Venezuelan government. In fact, a declassified U.S. National Intelligence Council report from April 2025 concedes that:
The Maduro regime probably does not have a policy of cooperating with TDA and is not directing TDA movement to and operations in the United States. The IC [intelligence community] bases this judgment on Venezuelan law enforcement actions demonstrating the regime treats TDA as a threat.
It goes on to note that Venezuelan intelligence, military, and police services have been “engaged in armed confrontations” with Tren de Aragua, and that it “has not observed the regime directing TDA, including to push migrants to the United States, which probably would require extensive [REDACTED] coordination.” “FBI analysts agree with the above assessment,” the document concludes.
The National Intelligence Council, an official government body, serves to deliver data gathered by intelligence services to lawmakers and the private sector.
Moreover, both Tren de Aragua’s size and scope have been vastly overstated by Trump and the media. The gang was born in a Venezuelan prison and is known to carry out smuggling and run extortion rackets. However, it was never on the scale of other criminal organizations such as the Sinaloa Cartel or MS-13. Ronna Rísquez, a Venezuelan investigative journalist (and fierce critic of Maduro) who wrote the first book on the cartel, estimated its peak size at just 3,000 members. “It’s not a group that has the capacity to be an enemy, not just of the United States, but of any country,” she said.
Moreover, both Tren de Aragua’s size and scope have been vastly overstated by Trump and the media. The gang was born in a Venezuelan prison and is known to carry out smuggling and run extortion rackets. However, it was never on the scale of other criminal organizations such as the Sinaloa Cartel or MS-13. Ronna Rísquez, a Venezuelan investigative journalist (and fierce critic of Maduro) who wrote the first book on the cartel, estimated its peak size at just 3,000 members. “It’s not a group that has the capacity to be an enemy, not just of the United States, but of any country,” she said.
Buxton agreed, characterizing the group as “small, minor, and urban” and thriving in the disorder of Venezuela’s sanctions-hit economic malaise. “Tren de Aragua is a very nasty organization,” she said, but added that,
The notion that the Tren de Aragua has a hemispheric reach, capacity, penetration, and presence in the United States is something of a myth. The U.S. really is facing far more significant challenges from transnationally organized gangs than anything presented from Venezuela.
Furthermore, for the best part of a decade, the Maduro administration has been suppressing Tren de Aragua, leading to the gang’s destruction inside Venezuela, forcing remaining members to leave the country. Its founder and leader, Niño Guerrero, is widely suspected to reside in Chile. And although some groups continue to use the Tren de Aragua moniker outside of Venezuela, it is far from clear the extent of the connections they have to both the original organization and to one another.
The notion that the Tren de Aragua has a hemispheric reach, capacity, penetration, and presence in the United States is something of a myth. The U.S. really is facing far more significant challenges from transnationally organized gangs than anything presented from Venezuela.
Furthermore, for the best part of a decade, the Maduro administration has been suppressing Tren de Aragua, leading to the gang’s destruction inside Venezuela, forcing remaining members to leave the country. Its founder and leader, Niño Guerrero, is widely suspected to reside in Chile. And although some groups continue to use the Tren de Aragua moniker outside of Venezuela, it is far from clear the extent of the connections they have to both the original organization and to one another.
While Tren de Aragua might be far less powerful than it is often depicted, it at least exists, something which cannot be said for the Cartel of the Suns, the drug-running syndicate supposedly headed by Maduro himself. Experts largely agree that the group is fictional. “The idea of the Cartel de los Soles is nonsense,” Buxton said, adding that,
The notion that somehow the Maduro government and the military are surviving on cocaine revenues is nonsense, because the value of cocaine is really low in Latin America. It is only when it has gone through the supply routes and the value added of cross border movements that cocaine becomes of any value.
Buxton’s latest book, “What Is Drug Policy For?,” is published later this month.
President Trump’s claim that the Venezuelan boats his administration targeted were packed with fentanyl is also inconsistent with DEA reporting, which does not list Venezuela as a producer or principal vector for fentanyl. In fact, neither the DEA’s “Fentanyl Flow to the United States,” intelligence report, nor the recent Congressional investigation into fentanyl trafficking mentions Venezuela at all.
The notion that somehow the Maduro government and the military are surviving on cocaine revenues is nonsense, because the value of cocaine is really low in Latin America. It is only when it has gone through the supply routes and the value added of cross border movements that cocaine becomes of any value.
Buxton’s latest book, “What Is Drug Policy For?,” is published later this month.
President Trump’s claim that the Venezuelan boats his administration targeted were packed with fentanyl is also inconsistent with DEA reporting, which does not list Venezuela as a producer or principal vector for fentanyl. In fact, neither the DEA’s “Fentanyl Flow to the United States,” intelligence report, nor the recent Congressional investigation into fentanyl trafficking mentions Venezuela at all.
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