While
the rising neocons were pushing for military action, US officials
feared that a Soviet response could lead in a similar 1962 missile
crisis with unknown consequences
“Secretary
of State Henry Kissinger ordered a series of secret contingency plans
that included airstrikes and mining of Cuban harbors in the aftermath
of Fidel Castro's decision to send Cuban forces into Angola in late
1975, ...”
“Kissinger
instructed General George Brown of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during a
high-level meeting of national security officials on March 24, 1976,
that included then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. 'I
think we are going to have to smash Castro,' Kissinger told President
Ford. 'We probably can't do it before the [1976 presidential]
elections.' 'I agree,' the president responded.”
“...
Kissinger's consideration of open hostilities with Cuba came after a
protracted effort of secret diplomatic talks to normalize relations
[...] Cuba's efforts at supporting the anti-colonial struggle in
Africa, the authors write, 'was the type of threat to U.S. interests
that Kissinger had hoped the prospect of better relations would
mitigate.'”
Kissinger
is described as “apoplectic" with Castro for "Cuba's
decision to deploy thousands of soldiers to Angola to assist the
Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) party of António
Agostinho Neto against attacks from insurgent groups that were
supported covertly by the United States and apartheid regime of South
Africa. Concerned that Castro would eventually broaden his
military incursion beyond Angola, Kissinger counseled Ford that they
would have to 'crack the Cubans.'"
“In the
March 24 meeting with an elite national security team known as the
Washington Special Actions Group, Kissinger expanded on the domino
scenario. 'If the Cubans destroy Rhodesia then Namibia is next and
then there is South Africa,' Kissinger argued. To permit the 'Cubans
as the shock troops of the revolution' in Africa, he argued, was
unacceptable and could cause racial tensions in the 'Caribbean with
the Cubans appealing to disaffected minorities and could then
spillover into South America and even into our own country.'
Moreover, the lack of a U.S. response to the global exercise of
military power by a small Caribbean island nation, Kissinger feared,
would be seen as American weakness.”
“Drafted
secretly by the Washington Special Actions Group in April 1976, the
contingency plans outlined punitive options that ranged from economic
and political sanctions to acts of war such as mining Cuba's
harbors, a naval quarantine, and strategic airstrikes 'to destroy
selected Cuban military and military-related targets.'”
“The
contingency planners warned Kissinger, however, that any act of
aggression could trigger a superpower confrontation. Unlike the 1962
missile crisis, stated one planning paper, 'a new Cuban crisis would
not necessarily lead to a Soviet retreat.' Indeed, 'a
Cuban/Soviet response could escalate in areas that would maximize US
casualties and thus provoke stronger response,' Kissinger's national
security advisers warned. 'The circumstances that could lead the
United States to select a military option against Cuba should be
serious enough to warrant further action in preparation for general
war.'”
In
details:
Comments
Post a Comment