Various
scenarios by the US mechanisms on how should be treated included a
preventive military action with Moscow's cooperation, up to let China
deploy "modest nuclear forces" as a threat to Soviet Union!
Similarities
with today's escalating Cold War 2.0
“Fifty
years ago today, on 16 October 1964, the People's Republic of China
(PRC) joined the nuclear club when it tested a nuclear device at its
Lop Nur test site in Inner Mongolia. U.S. intelligence had been
monitoring Chinese developments for some years, but the lack of
adequate sources made reliable estimates difficult. As prospects for
a nuclear test began to appear imminent in the early 1960s, a lively
debate commenced within the U.S. government over how soon it would
happen and what its implications would be. Amid questions over
whether Beijing would be 'truculent' or 'cautious' were proposals for
taking preventive military action, possibly with Moscow's
cooperation, or for finding ways, such as reassuring Asian allies
and changing the U.S. military posture, to adjust to the reality of a
nuclear China.”
“During
the summer of 1964, the discovery through satellite photography of a
test site led to speculation that Beijing would soon stage a nuclear
test. Other documents provide information on the State
Department's decision to announce the Chinese test in advance —
which it did on 29 September 1964 — in order to minimize its impact
on world opinion.”
“Analyses
saw increased risks that 'China will escalate hostilities to the
point of initiating nuclear operations,' while RAND Corporation
analysts argued that 'Chinese policy is likely to continue to be
cautious and rational and to seek gains by exploiting those
opportunities that represent acceptable levels of' risk.' Similarly,
the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR)
believed that China would avoid 'rash military action' because of its
'relative weakness,' and the risks of nuclear retaliation.”
“While
President Kennedy had been worried enough about the prospects of a
nuclear China to support contingency planning for preventive military
action, by the time of the test the U.S. government had decided
against such action. The arguments of an April 1964 top secret State
Department study may have been influential: 'the significance of [a
Chinese nuclear] capability is not such as to justify the undertaking
of actions which would involve great political costs or high military
risks.' Indeed, the author of that study noted that a preventive
strike could miss important facilities and Beijing would continue to
build the bomb. As views about Chinese caution became more typical, a
report from the Defense Department's Office of International Security
Affairs, prepared in early October 1964, was an outlier: based on the
assumption of rapid growth of Chinese nuclear forces, it saw 'very
important and potentially dangerous consequences,' including the need
by 1980 to 'think in terms of a possible 100 million U.S. deaths
whenever a serious conflict with China threatens.'"
“Nonproliferation
concerns shaped U.S. thinking about the significance of a nuclear
China. The possibility that a Chinese nuclear capability would
encourage decisions for national nuclear programs among China's
neighbors raised some anxiety, especially with respect to India.”
“While
a gaseous diffusion plant in Lanzhou had in fact produced the U-235,
U.S. intelligence did not believe that it had been in operation long
enough to produce enough fissile material, but could not identify
another possible source in China; moreover, it was 'difficult to
imagine that the Soviets would supply weapons-grade U-235.'"
“An
unofficial and unusual analysis prepared by INR analyst Helmut
Sonnenfeldt. Taking a classic balance of power approach to the
Sino-Soviet dispute, he argued that 'our efforts should be to weaken
the stronger and strengthen the weaker side in order to prolong a
dispute which is to some extent debilitating to both.' Accordingly,
Sonnenfeldt suggested that it might be in the U.S. interest if China
had 'modest' nuclear forces which could threaten the Soviet Union,
but not the United States.”
“That
Beijing wanted nuclear weapons, at least for basic security purposes,
was well understood in Washington. According to a major State
Department study from October 1963, a nuclear capability had 'direct
military value' to China as a deterrent against attack on its
territory.”
“By
late 1960, U.S. government intelligence officials were well aware
that Sino-Soviet tensions had led Moscow to cut off technical
assistance. All the same, one State Department intelligence officer
wrote that 'there is little doubt … that the Chinese have attained
a competence in atomic energy which would enable them eventually to
produce a weapon of their own, even with no further Soviet
assistance.'”
“Moreover,
a nuclear China, especially after the first test, 'will create
political and psychological influences that could materially weaken
the military position of the United States and its allies in Asia.'
To counter an emerging threat, Cary proposed a regional deterrent
force that would be 'plainly capable of devastating' China, without
threatening the Soviet Union (which he assumed would continue to have
strained alliance relations with Beijing). Such a force could 'deter
overt aggression …, permit the United States to impose ground
rules, within limits, if aggression occurs; and minimize the risk of
escalation uncontrolled by the United States.' Among other
recommendation was a capability for a 'rapid US local response' that
could control Chinese escalation and 'minimize pressures for active
Soviet support of Chinese military operations.'”
“...
RAND analysts drew a nuanced picture of a nuclear-armed China:
'Chinese policy is likely to continue to be cautious and rational and
to seek gains by exploiting those opportunities that represent
acceptable levels of risk.' Nevertheless, a nuclear China 'will
adversely affect U.S. alliances and military posture in Asia and …
generate pressures on U.S. freedom of action in the area.' To
compensate, the analysts proposed 'the designation and
maintenance in Pacific area of U.S. nuclear forces explicitly
targeted for China and capable of flexible and selective employment
against a wide range of Chinese aggressive actions.'*”
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