The memo shows the advice Hillary Clinton was getting to plunge the U.S. deeper into the Syrian war. As Trump seeks to extricate the U.S. the memo has again become relevant, writes Daniel Lazare.
by
Daniel Lazare
Part
2 - Central to the Great Debate
Consequently,
anyone stumbling across the memo in the Wikileaks archives might be
confused about how it figures in the great debate about whether to
use force to bring down Syrian President Bashir al-Assad. But textual
clues provide an answer. The second paragraph refers to nuclear talks
with Iran “that began in Istanbul this April and will continue
in Baghdad in May,” events that took place in 2012. The sixth
invokes an interview with CNN’s Christiane Amanpour, Rubin’s
wife, conducted with then-Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak “last
week.” Since the interview took place on April 19, 2012, the
memo can therefore be dated to the fourth week in April.
The memo
syncs with Clinton’s thinking on Syria, such as calling for Assad’s
overthrow and continuing to push for a no-fly zone in her last debate
with Donald Trump even after Gen. Joseph Dunford had testified to the
Senate Armed Services Committee that it could mean war with Russia.
The memo
was sent to her shortly before Clinton joined forces with then-CIA
Director David Petraeus to push for an aggressive program of rebel
military aid.
Needless
to say, the memo’s skepticism about negotiating with Iran proved to
be unwarranted since Iran eventually agreed to shut down its nuclear
program. The memo, which Clinton twice asked to be printed out for
her, underscores the conviction that Israeli security trumps all
other considerations even if it means setting fire to a region that’s
been burned over more than once.
But the
memo illustrates much else besides: a recklessness, lack of realism
and an almost mystical belief that everything will fall neatly into
place once the United States flexes its muscle. Overthrowing Assad
would be nothing less than “transformative,” the memo
says.
“…Iran
would be strategically isolated, unable to exert its influence in the
Middle East. The resulting regime in Syria will see the United States
as a friend, not an enemy. Washington would gain substantial
recognition as fighting for the people in the Arab world, not the
corrupt regimes. For Israel, the rationale for a bolt from the blue
attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities would be eased. And a new
Syrian regime might well be open to early action on the frozen peace
talks with Israel. Hezbollah in Lebanon would be cut off from its
Iranian sponsor since Syria would no longer be a transit point for
Iranian training, assistance and missiles.”
It was
“a low-cost high-payoff approach,” the memo says, that
would eliminate one enemy, weaken two more, and generate such joy
among ordinary Syrians that peace talks between Damascus and Tel Aviv
will spring back to life. The risks appeared to be nil. Since “the
Libyan operation had no long-lasting consequences for the region,”
the memo supposes, referring to the overthrow of strongman Muammer
Gaddafi six months earlier, the Syrian operation wouldn’t either.
In a passage that may have influenced Clinton’s policy of a no-fly
zone, despite Dunford’s warning, the memo says: “Some argue
that U.S. involvement risks a wider war with Russia. But the Kosovo
example [in which NATO bombed Russian-ally Serbia] shows otherwise.
In that case, Russia had genuine ethnic and political ties to the
Serbs, which don’t exist between Russia and Syria, and even then
Russia did little more than complain. Russian officials have already
acknowledged they won’t stand in the way if intervention comes.”
So,
there was nothing to worry about. Sixty-five years of Arab-Israeli
conflict would fall by the wayside while Russia remains safely
marginalized.
Source,
links:
Comments
Post a Comment