CIA examined the possibility of assassination of the Iranian PM Mohammad Mosaddegh before the 1953 coup
On
June 15th, the State Department released a long-awaited
“retrospective” volume of declassified U.S. government documents
on the 1953 coup in Iran. The volume includes fascinating details on
Iranian, American and British planning and implementation of the
covert operation, as well as information about U.S. contacts with key
figures such as Ayatollah Abol-Ghasem Kashani, and insights into U.S.
concerns about the growing influence of communist Tudeh Party. This
Foreign Relations volume focuses on the use of covert operations by
the Truman and Eisenhower administrations as an adjunct to their
respective policies toward Iran, culminating in the overthrow of the
Mosadeq government in August 1953. Moreover, the volume documents the
involvement of the U.S. intelligence community in the policy
formulation process and places it within the broader Cold War
context.
[nsarchive.gwu.edu]
The volume
contains a significant amount of new information related to the 1953
coup. A memorandum
from the then Director of Central Intelligence, Allen Dulles, to
President Eisenhower, on March 1st, 1953 (more than five months
before the coup), shows that the US was monitoring closely the
developments and the internal power balance in Iran.
Dulles
examines the consequence of the "elimination of Mossadeq by
assassination or otherwise", although it is not clear
whether he refers to a possible operation that would be organized by
the CIA.
He also
monitors the power of Mossadeq's key opponent at that time, Mullah
Kashani, and what would happen if Kashani would take power in case
that "Mossadeq were to disappear".
He also
describes the connections of the CIA and the British with Quasqai
tribal leaders "with the view to eventual organization of
resistance in southern Iran if the North should go Communist."
Some
key points:
Ever since
the assassination of General Razmara in March 1951, and the
subsequent impasse and diplomatic break with Britain over the oil
negotiations, the Iranian situation has been slowly disintegrating.
The result has been a steady decrease in the power and influence
of the Western democracies and the building up of a situation where a
Communist takeover is becoming more and more of a possibility.
However, even the present crisis is likely to be unsatisfactorily
compromised without a Communist Tudeh victory. Of course, the
elimination of Mossadeq by assassination or otherwise
might precipitate decisive events except in the unlikely alternative
that the Shah should regain courage and decisiveness.
The
principal opposing forces are represented on the one hand by Prime
Minister Mossadeq and, on the other, by Mullah Kashani, with the Shah
apparently being used by Kashani.
Significant
elements of the Army will probably remain loyal to the Shah, but
whether or not they can be forged into an effective weapon in shaping
political developments depends on the Shah’s determination to use
them. So far this determination has not appeared. On the other hand,
Mossadeq appears to retain control of the chain of command.
As between
Mossadeq and Kashani, it appears that Mossadeq has still the greater
strength although he has obviously lost some prestige in Parliament
and among the people. Kashani’s following, however, is better
consolidated in the capital through a well organized “street
machine”, which Mossadeq does not possess.
If
Mossadeq maintains control he will increase his efforts to remove or
neutralize all opposition. His latent hostility toward the Shah is
likely to increase. He might resent Henderson’s activities during
the crisis. Mullah Kashani has been a key figure in promoting the
pro-Shah street demonstrations. He has also led Parliament’s attack
on Mossadeq. If Mossadeq were to disappear, Kashani would be a
serious contender for his position. Although personally not
acceptable to the Shah, the latter would be inclined to appoint him
prime minister if recommended by Parliament.
CIA has
been maintaining close contact with the Quasqai tribal leaders with
the view to eventual organization of resistance in southern Iran if
the North should go Communist. A considerable supply of small arms
and ammunition has been assembled [less
than 1 line not declassified] the nearest safe
available base. A considerable amount of cash is available in
Teheran. Both the arms and the cash could quickly be supplemented.
Although
the British have steadfastly denied it, there have been persistent
rumors that they have been organizing the southern Iranian tribes
with a view to an uprising at an appropriate moment to preserve the
southern portion of Iran from Communist control. British contact with
these tribes in the past has been close, and this may constitute a
contingent asset of some value to the West if the situation
deteriorates further.
Mohammad
Mosaddegh was an Iranian politician. He was the head of a
democratically elected government, holding office as the Prime
Minister of Iran from 1951 until 1953, when his government was
overthrown in a coup d'état aided by the United States' Central
Intelligence Agency and the United Kingdom's Secret Intelligence
Service.
An
author, administrator, lawyer, and prominent parliamentarian, his
administration introduced a range of progressive social and political
reforms such as social security and land reforms, including taxation
of the rent on land. His government's most notable policy, however,
was the nationalization of the Iranian oil industry, which had been
under British control since 1913 through the Anglo-Persian Oil
Company (APOC/AIOC) (later British Petroleum and BP).
Many
Iranians regard Mosaddegh as the leading champion of secular
democracy and resistance to foreign domination in Iran's modern
history. Mosaddegh was removed from power in a coup on 19 August
1953, organised and carried out by the CIA at the request of MI6,
which chose Iranian General Fazlollah Zahedi to succeed Mosaddegh.
While the
coup is commonly referred to in the West as Operation Ajax after its
CIA cryptonym, in Iran it is referred to as the 28 Mordad 1332 coup,
after its date on the Iranian calendar. Mosaddegh was imprisoned for
three years, then put under house arrest until his death and was
buried in his own home so as to prevent a political furor.
The Tudeh
Party of Iran is an Iranian communist party. Formed in 1941, with
Soleiman Mohsen Eskandari as its head, it had considerable influence
in its early years and played an important role during Mohammad
Mosaddegh's campaign to nationalize the Anglo-Persian Oil Company and
his term as prime minister. The crackdown that followed the 1953 coup
against Mosaddegh is said to have "destroyed" the party,
although it continued. The party still exists, but is much weaker as
a result of the banning of the party and mass arrests by the Islamic
Republic in 1982 and the executions of political prisoners in 1988.
Allen
Welsh Dulles was an American diplomat and lawyer who became the first
civilian but third Director of Central Intelligence and its
longest-serving director to date. As head of the Central Intelligence
Agency during the early Cold War, he oversaw the 1954 Guatemalan coup
d'état, Operation Ajax (the overthrow of Iran's elected government),
the Lockheed U-2 aircraft program and the Bay of Pigs Invasion.
Following the assassination of John F. Kennedy, Dulles was one of the
members of the Warren Commission. Between his stints of government
service, Dulles was a corporate lawyer and partner at Sullivan &
Cromwell. His older brother, John Foster Dulles, was the Secretary of
State during the Eisenhower Administration.
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