In
light of developments in Greece, Germany’s Die Linke needs to
consider how it relates to the European Union.
by Nicole
Gohlke & Janine Wissler
The
following statement was published last week by Nicole Gohlke and
Janine Wissler, two radical MPs in Germany’s Die Linke (The Left
Party) associated with one of its far-left currents, Marx21. In it
they criticize what they perceive as the party’s failure to
entertain political possibilities outside of the eurozone, limiting
itself to strategies of creating a “social Europe” within the
confines of the European Union (EU). Instead, they argue for a
widening of the strategic debate in Die Linke in light of Syriza’s
defeat at the hands of the troika.
Until now
the debate within Die Linke around its stance toward the EU has
largely been restricted by the party’s understandable desire to
stand with and support the Syriza government, as well as a
longstanding belief on large parts of the German left that any
opposition to the EU runs the risk of backsliding into nationalist
populism and is thus to be avoided. This refusal to entertain visions
of a radical social transformation outside the bounds of the EU has
necessarily limited Die Linke (and other important parts of the
European left) to vague calls for a reformed, mildly
social-democratic EU.
Syriza’s
experience with the troika has begun to prompt a rethinking of this
stance. Though Gohlke and Wissler are by no means the only figures in
the party calling for such a rethinking, this contribution represents
one of the most prominent of the last weeks. The events of the past
weeks in Athens and Brussels are prompting sharp strategic debates
all across the continent, and Germany is no exception.
The Terms
of the Debate
On July 17
the parliamentary faction of the Left Party rejected the latest
austerity program being pushed on Greece, with fifty-three MPs voting
against and two abstaining. Die Linke‘s vote demonstrated a clear
“oxi” to the blackmailing of the Greek government by Angela
Merkel, Wolfgang Schäuble, and Sigmar Gabriel.
Although
that may seem unsurprising coming from a leftist formation, it
represents in all honesty a redefinition of our position, given that
in February of this year a large majority of our parliamentary
fraction voted “yes” to the bailout extension, while a minority
abstained and an even smaller minority voted “no.”
Granted, the
February vote was a different one, incomparable in terms of the
gravity of the decision being put to a vote. The argument in favor of
supporting Greece’s newly minted leftist government by giving them
time to maneuver had to be taken particularly seriously at the time,
despite the fact that the blackmail tactics and neoliberal demands of
the European institutions were already plain to see.
Unlike in
February, Die Linke voted “oxi” this time because the German
government had forced the most severe austerity package since 2010
onto the Greek government. Unfortunately, Alexis Tsipras and the
majority of Syriza MPs saw no way out of this blackmail, and accepted
the austerity package.
This defeat
represents an occasion to reflect, ask questions, and exercise some
self-criticism. The capitulation of the first genuinely leftist
government within the European Union since the outbreak of the
economic crisis to the German government and the other European
governments that follow Germany’s lead is ultimately our own
defeat, and a defeat for the entire European left as well.
We must take
this moment to rethink the central strategic premises that have
guided our politics these past months, i.e. our principled “yes”
to the EU and our categorical “no” to leaving the eurozone. Doing
so means rethinking our political strategy as a left party as a
whole. As a party of the European Left, we are obligated to discuss
this question with our comrades throughout the continent and in
Greece in particular. We cannot abandon them in this difficult
situation.
It is of
little use (and counterproductive) to denounce Syriza as traitors and
declare their political demise. That is the job of our political
opponents seeking to suffocate the political awakening happening in
Greece. Equally as unhelpful, however, are knee-jerk reactions and
blind, unquestioning loyalties.
We should
neither reject nor uncritically support everything the Syriza
government has attempted to end the widespread and ongoing
impoverishment of the Greek people. The sort of disdainful moralism
that says we as Germans and “outsiders” have no right to develop
an opinion or a critique of what is happening in Greece will not help
us to learn any political lessons from the situation either.
We owe both
ourselves and our Greek comrades an honest and solidaristic debate
about both the strategic successes as well as mistakes of the past
months, especially if we wish to continue to fight together against
austerity in Europe and prepare ourselves for coming European
struggles. Thus it is crucial that we be confident enough to
critically reflect on what has happened, to discuss Greece’s exit
from the eurozone as a possible alternative, and attempt to
understand what the current defeat and the massive “oxi” vote
means.
In Bad
Faith
Since being
elected, Alexis Tsipras was blackmailed by the rest of the European
heads of state, to whom he ultimately capitulated. He admitted as
much to the Greek Parliament. His defeat is not a personal failure,
nor is it due to some sort of egotistical drive to retain power on
his part.
Nevertheless,
the central premises of the Greek government’s political strategy —
the non-negotiability of staying in the eurozone while simultaneously
rejecting a politics of austerity — would not (and could not) have
had any other result. Ultimately, this strategy gave the Greek
government no choice but to submit to the diktat of Merkel and
Schaeuble. We supported our Greek comrades in their strategy and had
hoped that some sort of middle path could be found, but in retrospect
we have to concede that no such middle path existed.
Former
Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis recently published a telling
account of the Eurogroup negotiations, in which he reveals that the
suggestions of the Greek side were never really even taken seriously
— doing so, after all, would have entailed a serious discussion
about alternatives to austerity and the possibility of concessions
from the Eurogroup.
This means
that, in reality, the closed-door “negotiations” in Brussels were
not negotiations at all, but rather a series of meetings in which the
Eurogroup repeatedly decided that the compromises Syriza was willing
to make were still miles away from what the Eurogroup sought to
squeeze out of the country.
This dynamic
culminated in Varoufakis — Greek minister of finance and official
representative of an EU member state — being ejected and excluded
from the Eurogroup meeting. His attempt to consult the Eurogroup’s
bylaws subsequently revealed that the Eurogroup does not formally
exist, and thus does not offer any rights or privileges to individual
member states. And thus it was that the supposedly fair European
rules of the game were shattered on the rocks of a Europe under
German leadership.
In light of
these facts, we must accept that the Syriza government’s strategy
that focused on negotiation and diplomatic dialogue has failed. Not
even the charismatic personalities of Tsipras and Varoufakis, nor
extensive expertise and deep negotiating tactics, were enough to win
real influence or shift the balance of forces within the European
institutions even slightly.
The pledge
to abstain from “unilateral actions” did not gain Syriza any
extra time or breathing room. Rather, the negotiations proved that
the European institutions are unfavorable and adverse terrain for the
Left, and that a strategy of offering concessions to the other side
in hopes of salvaging at least a modicum of humane social policies
will fail. Merkel, Schäuble, and Gabriel were not interested in
Greece alone: Greece was to serve as an example for the rest of
Europe.
The message
that the defeat is intended to send is this: it does not matter how
many general strikes are conducted, it does not matter if you elect a
new government and the majority of the population votes “oxi” in
a popular referendum. These things will not help you and will not
change your country’s politics.
That is the
message that they want to use to demoralize the entire European left
and stifle social protest across the continent. This demoralization
and disappointment can only be countered if the European left
conducts an open and self-critical debate about the lessons to be
drawn from the current defeat.
A
Left-Wing Grexit
Ultimately,
Schäuble (in collusion with Sigmar Gabriel) threatened the Greek
side with a forced Grexit from the Right. A Grexit “from the Right”
would mean Greece leaving the euro unprepared, with the conditions
for switching currencies, stabilizing an exchange rate, and
restructuring the debt being negotiated with the EU from a position
of profound weakness. Whether Schäuble and the conservative factions
of European capital were seriously considering this option, or
whether it was simply further political blackmail to force more
concessions out of Syriza in light of the party’s lack of a
strategic alternative, is difficult to say.
Either way,
the Left in Europe utterly failed to think through a Plan B in a
serious manner. Thus, Greek’s left government was robbed of any
possible alternative in its negotiations with the lenders. Not having
a Plan B meant Syriza had only one option: remaining in the eurozone
at all costs. Thus, the institutions could demand as much from the
Greek government as they saw fit, because the only other possibility
was the break which was to be avoided no matter what.
What, then,
could our Plan B look like? This undertaking strikes us a difficult
one that poses more questions than it offers answers. Though there
are many important contributions on the issue of a Plan B,
particularly from the Greek left itself, there has yet to exist a
detailed scenario for a left-wing Grexit.
The relative
attractiveness thereof is owed more than anything to the alternative
to it: remaining in the eurozone would mean further austerity and
immiseration, the de facto abandonment of democratic and
parliamentary competencies, and a historic political test for Syriza
as a party. Remaining in the eurozone has forced the Syriza
government — at least for now — to switch tracks from being a
bitter enemy of austerity to the executive organ of the troika
dictatorship in Greece.
A
self-determined, left-wing Grexit is by no means a simple or an easy
solution. The economic consequences thereof in particular remain
highly controversial amongst left-wing economists and social
scientists. At this point they appear to be more or less
unpredictable. In the short term, a Grexit could mean a deepening of
social fault lines, economic collapse, and further impoverishment of
the Greek people.
On the other
hand, it could also mean opening up new spaces of political
maneuvering and scopes of action: e.g., self-directed lending,
national measures against capital flight, and increased taxes on the
rich without first having to seek the troika’s approval. These
options are at least worth exploring. Such a move would of course
mean taking on an almost incalculable political risk for the parties
involved. It would entail a leap into the unknown, accompanied by the
fear of being held politically responsible for missteps and
unexpected consequences that may arise from it.
Our Greek
comrades have nevertheless already demonstrated their willingness to
think boldly and take risks. For example: in the heat of sharpening
contradictions immediately before the referendum, Yanis Varoufakis
suggested a raft of unilateral counter-measures to the prime
minister’s cabinet as a reaction to the European Central Bank’s
closing of Greek banks.
His
suggestions can be read as a first step towards a self-directed exit
from the eurozone. He suggested: 1) printing Greek promissory notes
or announcing the government’s intention to introduce a separate
currency (still tied to the euro), 2) enacting a haircut on Greek
bonds held by the ECB since 2012, and 3) taking control of the Greek
central bank.
What Do
the People Want?
In the left
debate around the Grexit, there is usually a political argument in
addition to the economic: the majority of Greeks want to remain in
the eurozone, meaning that the Syriza government could only undertake
a left-wing Grexit against the wishes of the majority.
But is that
really the case, or should we instead understand this moment as one
of a contradictory dynamic within a scenario of polarized class
conflict? It is undeniably the case that when asked if they would
like to remain in the Eurozone — decoupled from the austerity
program that remaining in the eurozone entails — a majority of
Greeks respond with “yes.” But would the same be true if this
question were posed with a clear focus on the link to austerity?
The Greek
people’s preference for what seems like the easier solution (i.e.,
remaining in the eurozone while ending austerity) is not necessarily
incompatible with a readiness to accept the consequences of a Grexit
should it prove necessary — particularly if breaking with austerity
while remaining in the eurozone proves to be impossible. This is
precisely what the 61 percent of Greeks who voted “oxi” in the
referendum on the July 5 expressed.
Although
Alexis Tsipras sought to emphasize that the referendum was not
primarily a vote on the question of Greece’s preferred currency,
for most Greeks it was clear that they were making a choice between
remaining in the eurozone (and thereby continuing austerity) on the
one hand, and a clear rejection of the offer made by the
“institutions” (and thus the possibility of a Grexit) on the
other.
The Greek
media sought to project just such a mood and stylize the referendum
in this way. Panic and alarm about shuttered banks, images of long
lines in front of (nearly) empty ATMs, a collapse of public life —
the media established a doomsday scenario as the backdrop to the
referendum in Greece, which the Eurogroup in turn used as a threat.
The message
that emerges from 61 percent of the population voting “oxi” in
the referendum is amplified by the very real relation between social
position and voting behavior: the financially disadvantaged and
socially marginalized voted against the deal in huge majorities. The
referendum thus seems to indicate that remaining in the eurozone
unconditionally is not necessarily a goal shared by the majority of
the population, but is rather a project of the ruling and propertied
classes of Greece.
A Common
Defeat
The
referendum also demonstrated how the brave actions of our comrades
and the initiative to launch the referendum could lead to an enormous
re-politicization of Greek society and renewal of the social
movements. Many felt this possibility when Gregor Gysi and
representatives of the Blockupy coalition spoke in front of tens of
thousands at the closing rally at Syntagma Square. The mobilization
around the referendum and the very overwhelming “oxi” vote
indicate that there is most certainly an enormous desire for
political alternatives and a Plan B within Greece itself.
Our comrades
in the government had five months to convince a majority of the
population of the utility of a Plan B. We had five months to
demonstrate to the Greek people that we were doing everything
possible to fulfill our electoral promise of ending austerity while
remaining in the euro. But having a Plan B also means establishing
red lines that we are unwilling to cross. It also means that —
should an end to austerity inside the eurozone have proved impossible
— then a real and plausible alternative to capitulation had to
exist.
At the same
time it would have been necessary, perhaps along the lines of
Varoufakis’s suggestions, to begin making serious preparations for
the worst-case scenario, i.e. preparing to issue promissory notes, to
print a new national currency, to nationalize the banks, and to
introduce capital controls.
Whether or
not our comrades in Syriza could have won over a majority of the
population to an exit from the eurozone in the case of a final
breakdown of negotiations is of course difficult to say. The lack of
a strategic alternative to remaining in the eurozone, however, not
only weakened our negotiating position, but was also disorienting for
people looking to the new government for hope and inspiration both in
and outside of Greece.
The
responsibility for the mistake of not preparing a Plan B and not
fighting to win over majorities in favor of such a strategy is not
that of Syriza alone — it is the responsibility of the entire
European left. We all owe it to ourselves to reflect critically on
the fact that we neglected to utilize or even entertain the thought
of utilizing our last remaining strategic resource: a break with the
institutions and the eurozone, thereby developing the scenario of a
left-wing Grexit. Thus we have neither reason nor justification to
act as if we had known better than our Greek comrades.
No one can
claim that we would have performed better or more intelligently than
they did. In fact, illusions about the space for maneuver and scope
for reform within the EU are probably even more widespread on the
German left than they are in Greece. These sorts of illusions were
consistently nourished by our own party in the last European
elections, while some currents went so far as to claim that
principled left-wing criticism of the EU and its institutions was
impossible.
In light of
this mistake, we must engage in thoroughgoing self-reflection and
self-criticism. For our common defeat suggests that truly left
politics in Europe can from now on only be oriented against the
institutions of the EU. It follows that, for a socialist government
in the European periphery, left politics may only be possible outside
of the straightjacket of the Eurogroup altogether.
Shattering
the EU Illusion
So what
questions have to be reevaluated in the EU debate? In Germany, a
major reason why Die Linke often finds it difficult to criticize the
EU as an imperialist project is because it is portrayed as a
historical lesson learned after the second World War. As the story
goes, the once warring great powers of Europe joined together in a
new geopolitical alliance which would make future armed conflict on
the continent a thing of the past.
Philosophers
such as Jürgen Habermas take this point of departure to praise the
EU as a post-national construct and an alternative to the European
nation-state. But even though the EU has greatly transformed the
political relations between its constituent member states, economic
competition between said states has not been lessened by this
transformation whatsoever. Indeed: the negotiations around Greece’s
latest bailout extension make them easy for all to see.
That the EU
introduced a common currency but not a common wage, social, or
budgetary policy is not a mistake or an accident, nor is it a
temporary condition of an as-yet-unfinished European Union. The
construction of the euro and Germany’s aggressive export strategy
are harmful to economically weaker countries like Greece,
particularly since the various states do not share a common or
coordinated economic policy. Instead of constraining the power of the
German economy and political establishment, the EU simply provides it
with a post-national alibi.
It is now
clear that from now on “German” is to be spoken in Europe, as
Volker Kauder gleefully declared a few months ago. Given this state
of affairs, we must determine to what extent an EU-wide “reboot”
of the European project constitutes a useful demand for class
struggle in Europe.
The
consequences of EU policies are very different depending on whether
we are talking about Germany or Greece, Great Britain or Portugal. A
state-driven reconfiguration of European social policy would require
a synchronized political shift in nearly all twenty-eight member
states. Even then, major corporations and financial markets would
still serve as powerful opponents of any possible social reform.
We do not
believe that concrete solidarity between the peoples of Europe is
possible by making positive reference to an EU that is imagined and
enacted by national governments as a common currency area and
economic zone. The various struggles against austerity and for
improved living conditions across Europe (which admittedly are yet to
be united in common cause) appear to us as much more promising
prospects. Not to be ignored is the concrete struggle against old and
new forms of fascism and racism; this means fighting Pegida in
Germany, the National Front in France, and Golden Dawn in Greece.
It is time
to make the policies and politics of the EU the subject of the real
social struggles existing in the various member states, rather than
continuing to speak of a “social EU” for which we will be unable
to build a social movement in the foreseeable future. Our politics
must contribute to establishing, expanding and deepening pan-European
networks of solidarity between political actors and activists in
European, national, regional, and local movements.
Following
Greece’s subjugation under the diktat of the institutions, it is
both unlikely as well as inappropriate to expect that our comrades in
the European Left will continue to view the EU or the euro in a
positive light, as membership in the eurozone has revealed itself to
be an instrument for the implementation and enforcement of austerity
policies.
Living Up
to the Slogans
It makes
little sense to retrospectively search for the obstacles to a
different conclusion of the Greek tragedy exclusively or even
primarily in Greece itself. The reasons for Syriza’s (tentative)
failure lie primarily in the absence of relevant left movements in
the rest of Europe, as well as in the historic weakness of the Left
in Germany. We believe that new and stronger efforts are necessary if
we are to achieve a true social realignment in Germany with Die
Linke.
We remain a
party that receives 10 percent in elections and are only able to
mobilize twenty thousand protesters to the Blockupy demonstrations.
Our roots in the trade unions are still paltry, although we are at
least mobilizing together against the Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership (TTIP) in the fall.
This common
action is important, but it is still far too little if we really want
to live up to our slogan of “carrying the resistance into the heart
of the European crisis regime.” To do so, we are going to have to
go back to the drawing board and do our homework, in order to build
an “oxi” to neoliberalism and austerity that truly earns its
name.
One lesson
of this defeat is to rethink the premises of our own politics and to
dare to entertain the possibility of a break. A break with an EU that
strengthens rather than overcomes nationalism, the sealing-off of
European borders, and imperialist conflict. A break with a purely
parliamentary politics that reduces parties to something one votes
for once every few years and reduces parliaments to bodies for
implementing the wishes of corporate lobbyists.
The best and
most important kind of solidarity we can offer the people in Greece
is to start putting real pressure on the German government here at
home.
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